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Liberalism Hand in Hand with Dictatorship in Thailand
Giles Ji Ungpakorn, Workers Democracy, Thailand
25 July 2007
The 19th September 2006 coup, which overthrew the government of Thaksin Shinawat and destroyed Thai democracy along with the 1997 Constitution, has not only prolonged and intensified the Thai political crisis, it has also exposed the true nature of Thai Liberalism. Liberalism, both in its political and economic forms, has tried to claim the mantle of Democracy, even more so since the end of the Cold War. Yet the 19th September coup in Thailand was carried out in order to support the free-market and it was supported by a wide array of liberal academics and politicians. This helps to expose the true, undemocratic nature of Liberalism.
Today the country, and the Peoples' Movement, are split down the middle between those who have lined up to support the military junta and those who oppose it. The immediate debate right now is centred around the military's new Constitution which is being put to a referendum on 19 August. The military are so worried that they will lose the vote that they have tried to ban anyone from campaigning against this reactionary Constitution. They have also increased censorship of the media and enacted a number of authoritarian measures, including suppression of street protests.
Ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawat founded the Thai Rak Thai party after the economic crisis of 1997. The party is unique in recent Thai political history in that it actually spent considerable time developing policies. Ever since the collapse of the Maoist Communist Party of Thailand, Thai politics has been monopolised by political parties of the capitalist class. Previously they did not bother to come up with any policies, relying instead on vote buying and big name politicians. Thai Rak Thai held meetings with different social groups and came up with real policies at the time of their first election victory in 2001. Thai Rak Thai is a "Populist" party of the bosses which offered pro-poor policies and village level Keynesian economic stimuli by pumping state money into local projects. The aim was to create social peace after the 1997 economic crisis so that the government could increase Thailand's economic competitiveness. At the same the party pursued neo-liberal policies such as privatisation and the support for free trade agreements (F.T.A.s). This mixed economic model was what Thai Rak Thai called a "dual track" policy.
The poor, who form the vast majority of the Thai electorate, voted enthusiastically for the two flagship policies of the party. These were a universal health care scheme (the first ever in Thailand) and a 1 million baht fund, loaned to each village to encourage small businesses. Thai Rak Thai won a second term of office with an overall majority in parliament in 2005. It is easy to see why. The main opposition party, the Democrats, spent the whole four years attacking the health care system and other social benefits. They said that it contravened "fiscal discipline" and well known liberal academics who are now supporters of the junta, echoed Margaret Thatcher in talking of "a climate of dependency". Previously the Democrat government, which came to power immediately after the economic crisis, had used taxes paid by the poor to prop up the financial system. The banks were in crisis due to wild speculation by the rich which resulted in non-performing loans. Today, the military-backed draft Constitution contains the neo-liberal phrase "fiscal discipline" on 3 separate occasions, but not when it mentions the need to increase military spending.
There was of course a very nasty side to the Thaksin government, despite its Populism. During their first term of office they waged a so-called "war on drugs" in which over 3000 people were shot without ever coming to trial. Even worse, in the three southern-most provinces they waged a campaign of violence against the Muslim Malay population, the incident at Takbai where 90 young men were murdered by security forces, being one terrible example. Despite hollow claims by the military junta to be seeking a peaceful solution to the south, the violence is now much worse after the coup.
Whatever one might think about the Thaksin government, there is no question that it was supported by a clear majority of the electorate in 2005 and again in 2006. What is more, there is no evidence that there was any significant cheating in those elections which would have changed the outcome. Yet "electoral fraud" was one justification for the military take over. This excuse was also used in order to disband Thai Rak Thai a few months ago, in order to pave the way for fixed elections without the party. This caused much anger among the party's supporters, resulting in street demonstrations.
The major forces behind the 19th September coup were anti-democratic groups in the military and civilian elite, disgruntled business leaders, sections of the middle classes and neo-liberal intellectuals and politicians. The coup was also supported by the Monarchy. It would come as little surprise to many that both the Monarchy and important sections of the military and bureaucratic elite have little regard for democracy. But since the previous coup of 1991 and the mass movement which overthrew the military one year later, in 1992, the military and bureaucratic elites are not exclusively committed to dictatorship either. The new post-Cold War strategy of the Thai ruling class means that if the democratic process provides a means to power, status and enrichment, they are happy to choose this path too. There is therefore an underlying contradiction between support for democracy and dictatorship within the elites, which also extends into the ranks of the middle classes. Contrary to mainstream claims, the push for democratisation has always been spearheaded by the social movements or the Peoples' Movement, rather than the middle classes.
What all the pro-coup groups have in common is contempt and hatred for the poor. Therefore, this is a class issue. Social justice and democracy cannot be separated from one another and this is the root cause of the contradiction between democracy and dictatorship among the elites. For the elites and middle classes, "too much democracy" in the last decade gave "too much" power to the poor electorate and encouraged the government to "over-spend" on welfare in order to gain mass support. The elites who were shut out of Thaksin's circle of friends became jealous of his political power but they could not defeat him in elections.
For the liberal intellectuals who support the coup, Thailand is divided between the "enlightened" middle and upper classes who "understand democracy" and the "ignorant" rural and urban poor who sell their votes and are "trapped in a patron-client system". In fact, the reverse is the case. It is the poor who are more likely today to understand that democracy brings with it trade union rights, more social justice, income distribution and governments which listen to the poor.
Continued in next post
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http://www.prachatai.com/english/news.php?id=122
There is a mistaken view that the junta is somehow opposed to "modern capitalism". This is because they claim to use the King's "Small is Beautiful" or "Sufficiency" economic philosophy and attack the previous government for being "run by capitalists". In fact, the new military appointed cabinet was stuffed full of neo-liberals. After the coup the Budget Bureau cut the budget for Thai Rak Thai's universal health care scheme by 23% while increasing military spending by 30%. The Foreign and Commerce Ministers are supporters of un-popular Free Trade Agreements. The junta therefore rammed through the F.T.A. with Japan with no public consultation. Further moves to privatise electricity and the railways were announced, fuel subsidies cut, and a bill for university privatisation ("autonomy") was forwarded to the military-appointed parliament. The autocrats of the junta ensured that they would not go hungry by paying themselves fat cat salaries, no doubt funded out of savings made by cutting the pro-poor policies of the previous government.
While feathering their own nests, the pro-junta elite claimed to be following the King's philosophy of "Sufficiency" and the importance of "not being greedy". The message was meant for the poor, not the junta's supporters. Apparently everyone must be content with their own level of Sufficiency. For the Palace, "Sufficiency" means owning a string of palaces and large capitalist conglomerates such as the Siam Commercial Bank. For the military junta it means receiving multiple fat cat salaries and for poor farmers it means scratching a living without modern investment in agriculture.
One huge problem with Thai politics is that there is no mass political party of the trade unions or small farmer movements which can challenge populist parties of big business or the undemocratic elites. This means that the Peoples Movement has been split into 3 factions: those who support the reactionaries behind the coup, those who want to oppose the coup by building an alliance with Thai Rak Thai and those who want to build an independent class movement.
What is interesting about the 19th September coup is that it had to rely on support from important sections of the Peoples' Movement. Without the "welcome" from the Peoples Alliance for Democracy, the anti-Thaksin mass movement, which built an alliance with reactionary Monarchists, the coup-makers might never have had the confidence to seize power. Thailand has changed since the years of military rule in the 1970s. The Peoples' Movement is a key deciding factor in shaping political outcomes. Therefore the political orientation of this movement is a crucial factor in the democratisation process.
The Peoples' Movement was not dormant in its criticism of the government throughout the Thaksin period. The largest anti-government movement mounted by the working class against the Thaksin government was the action against electricity privatisation by 200,000 workers in 2004. It helped to delay privatisation plans and energised the labour movement. There was also a huge rally against the Thai-U.S. F.T.A. in Chiang Mai. In addition to this, smaller protest movements against various government policies took place on a regular basis. There is no question about the potential power of the Peoples' Movement. However, the unfortunate situation is that the politics of the movement is an obstacle to its use of that potential power in mobilising as an independent class force. In recent years the movement has been influenced by mainstream political and neo-liberal ideas and various sections of the movement have continually sought alliances with factions of the ruling class.
In order to understand why the Thai Peoples' Movement has been open to influence from right-wing liberal politics, you have to go back to the collapse of the Communist Party of Thailand (C.P.T.) in the early 1980s. All during the two decades of the 1960s and 1970s the C.P.T., with its Stalinist-Maoist politics, was the dominant influence on the Peoples' Movement. Like their sisters and brothers around the world, Thai activists reacted to the collapse of Communism both in terms of its failure and its authoritarian nature. The negative legacy of the C.P.T. means that there is a dominance of Autonomism, Post-Modernism and Third Way Reformism among the Thai Peoples' Movement. Autonomism rejects party organisation and challenging state power. Both it and Post-Modernism also reject political theories, which in the past were seen as "dictated from above" by the authoritarian C.P.T. Third Way Reformism is a capitulation to neo-liberalism among those who once believed in reforming capitalism along Social Democratic lines. The reasoning is that after the collapse of "Communism", there was "no longer any alternative to the free market".
The vacuum of non-politics created under these circumstances, allows liberalism to dominate the movement and forces many people into alliance with sections of the ruling class. The overall result is a movement which is de-politicised and concentrates on single-issue problem solving.
Never the less, this is not the whole picture. The recent Thai Social Forum in October 2006 and increased talk of the need for clear political alternatives to Thai Rak Thai and the conservative elites backing the coup, shows that the situation may be changing. Important sections of the movement now campaign for a welfare state based on progressive taxation, gender and community rights and many other general political positions. There are important groupings who are trying to stay independent of either the junta or the previous governing party and they have come out against the military's constitution.
Continued in next post
http://www.prachatai.com/english/news.php?id=122
Since the coup, the violence in the South has multiplied. This is a serious crisis of Thai society in which the Peoples' Movement must take a stand. This can only be done by opposing the ultra nationalism of the state. The crisis stems from a lack of respect, systematic state violence and a democratic deficit in the area, all created by governments over the last 200 years. Liberalism has no room for local autonomy and does not seriously reduce the coercive power of the Nation State. Successive Thai governments have sought to use military means in dealing with the unrest in the South. The opposition to the Thai State in these provinces takes many forms. There is a spectrum of local opinion ranging from separatism to demands for justice.
Back in the 1970s a clear separatist movement existed, cooperating in its struggle against the Thai State with the Communist Parties of Thailand and Malaysia. The Barisan Revolusi Nasiona (B.R.N.) was established in 1963 and the Pattani United Liberation Organisation (PULO) was founded in 1968. Yet PULO are not in a position to control much of what is happening on the ground today since they are mainly middle-aged activists in exile. In 1984 the B.R.N. had split into three. One organisation which originated from the B.R.N., is the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi (B.R.N.-C). By 2005 the militant Runda Kumpulan Kecil (R.K.K.) was becoming more prominent in the insurgency. The 2004 Takbai massacre carried out by the Thaksin government is the main reason. It is believed to be made up of B.R.N.-C people who trained in Indonesia. There seem to be many organizations operating today with some coordination between them.
Today the resistance is not just about planting bombs and shooting state officials. Communities act in a united way to protect themselves from the security forces who constantly abduct and kill people. Women and children block the roads and stop soldiers or police from entering villagers and there was a recent mass demonstration by students and villagers against state violence.
Since the coup, the junta has been encouraging so-called "local Buddhists" to protest against Muslim villagers who block the roads. They have also been arming local Buddhists. These moves are playing with fire. The Thai State risks creating a bloody communal war between Muslims and Buddhists. Peace can only come about by withdrawing troops and police from the area and starting political discussions involving the whole of Southern Civil Society, without any pre-conditions about maintaining the present state structures or borders of Thailand.
The fact that the 19th September coup leaders declared that their coup had "Royal backing" right from the start has risked plunging the Monarchy into crisis. Large numbers of Thais actually believe that the King planned and ordered the coup through his representatives in the Privy Council. The attitude of the 16 million poor people who voted for Thaksin towards this "Royal-backed" coup is unknown.
The Monarchy over the last 150 years has shown itself to be remarkably adaptable to all circumstances and able to gain in stature by making alliances with all sorts of groups, whether they are military dictatorships or elected governments. The image of the "traditional Absolute Monarch, loved by all" is an invented myth. In fact the Absolute Monarchy only existed for a short period in history between 1870 and 1932. After the 1932 revolution the Royalists quickly abandoned any hope of returning to Absolutism, choosing instead to support an increased role of the Monarchy under the Constitution. Despite the image of an all-powerful Monarchy, it is in fact weak. Yet it is an institution which is used to further the power of the elites because no criticism of the Monarchy is allowed. The Monarchy may have been pulled into supporting the coup by powerful elements in the military.
Yet there have also been significant moves to turn the Monarchy into a more Western style institution which can appear neutral in order to protect the status quo. There is thus a serious contradiction between the need for the Thai Monarch to be a modern institution, above politics and its direct involvement in coups and politics. This can only be a source of instability.
The 19th September coup was a coup in favour of the free-market and elite power. The democratic space has been seriously narrowed and the so-called "reform process" is taking a backward step. Inequality and lack of social justice are increasing under an extreme neo-liberal regime. Continuing state violence in the South risks creating a communal war between Buddhists and Muslims and the junta have laid the basis for the future instability of the Monarchy. It is the social movements or the Peoples' Movement in Civil Society which can expand the democratic space, while at the same time creating social justice. But the Peoples' Movement can only do this if it shakes off old ideas and creates its own independent political organisations with their own political theories. Thailand is crying out for a mass political party of workers, students and poor farmers.
http://www.prachatai.com/english/news.php?id=122
On a similar note, this from Pasuk Phongpaichit. I note that Pasuk's academic credentials have often been called into doubt by some in the political science and economics worlds. Personally, I don't think that detracts much from her message. I guess I'm not so interested in her academic credibility so much as the fact that she is saying things that are important, relevant and so rarely said in a straight forward and accessible manner. Certainly, its rarely rocket science with Pasuk, but I think I prefer it that way:
Thai politics beyond 2006 coup
By Pasuk Phongpaichit
(Based on the Supha Sirimanond Memorial Lecture delivered at the Political Economy Centre, Chulalongkorn University on July 25)
The most difficult task is how to convince the triple alliance behind the coup to accept a political system which accommodates everybody fairly.
The keywords of political debate of the 1990s were terms like civil society, rights and freedoms, participation, and reform. By contrast, the keywords of the 2000s have included authoritarianism, exclusion, coup, nominee, security, violence and reconciliation.
What has happened, and where will this lead?
Whether we like it or not, Thaksin Shinawatra’s premiership (2001-2006) has brought out a deep division in Thai society. On the one hand, the mass electorate embraced him as their leader and gave him three unprecedented election victories. On the other hand, old elite rejected him for being authoritarian, for using political power to enrich his family and cronies, and for threatening major longstanding institutions through his headlong pursuit of rapid change.
Thaksin’s populism
The core of this division is Mr Thaksin’s so-called ‘‘populism.’’ It’s important to understand where this came from. When he rose to power, Mr Thaksin showed no real interest in the masses. He became a popular leader over the following years because of the demand for such a leader.
This demand was a function of the social structure and politicisation. The accompanying diagram provides a sketch of Thai society in the 2000s. The formal working class — meaning those with relatively permanent jobs in enterprises of some scale — is very small, around 8% of the working population. The middle class, meaning anyone with a white-collar job including bureaucrats, professionals, and managers is around 15%.
The majority of the society, about 2/3 of the workforce, are in agriculture or the urban informal sector — vendors, mom-and-pop stores, services, small enterprises, illegal businesses and a big casual workforce floating between many jobs. People move back and forth between agriculture and the urban informal sector.
Remittances from urban informal work subsidise faltering agricultural incomes. Together these two groups form the ‘‘informal mass.’’ They are outside the state legal structure and social protection, and they dominate the electorate. For this informal mass, the financial crisis of 1997 was a key moment of politicisation. They did not cause the crisis but bore much of the impact (especially through unemployment), and received no relief. The resentment, and resulting politicisation, led to a wave of demonstrations, such as for debt relief, over 1998-9.
This wave coincided with Mr Thaksin’s bid for political power. As a wealthy businessman, he was an unlikely candidate to become a populist leader. But he became more intensely a populist over the next five years — as he realised the potential of the informal mass as a base of popular electoral support.
First, he offered social policies which were universal in scope (e.g., cheap health care for everybody) and thus appealed to the informal mass which is usually exempted from formal welfare schemes.
Second, he made himself into a public figure which members of the informal mass could imagine they owned, partly by deliberately distancing himself from old elite of bureaucrats, politicians, and intellectuals.
Third, he claimed that he was the mechanism which translated the will of the people into action by the state, overriding democratic principles, judicial process and the rule-oflaw on grounds that these principles had never benefited the ordinary people.
The 2006 coup
Mr Thaksin had politicised the gaping division in Thai society — between the urban elite and the great informal mass — which had been developing over the past half century of development. The leaders of the coup explicitly cited this division as one of the four justifications for the coup.
His populist trend has frightened the ruling elites, the military and a large segment of the middle class. These three elements joined hands in the coup of September 2006. The army provided the force. The ruling elites provided traditional legitimation. The middle class gave support in public space. Even though the middle class is a minority, it shapes and dominates the public space in which politics is debated. In this space, Mr Thaksin was condemned as a demon, and the coup was given a warm welcome.
The crucial point for understanding the participation by the ruling elites and army is to realise that 2006 is actually one point in a sequence going back to the coups of 1947, 1957 and 1976.
In all these four events, the army and royalists moved in alliance to eject an elected government on grounds that the elected government was too weak, too strong, too corrupt, too disrespectful of the monarchy, or too something else.
In 2006, the army had a special reason to participate. Mr Thaksin had been trying to bring the army under his personal control. The old guard in the military and a lot of their upcoming subordinates resented this.
The army also saw an opportunity to gain redemption for the army’s role in 1992, which had reduced their status so dramatically. The military had long wanted to regain some of its former prominence, and the opportunity to overthrow Mr Thaksin gave them the chance.
The middle class initially welcomed Mr Thaksin in 2001 as a leader to continue the modernisation reforms begun in the 1990s. Their support held up for four years, but in 2005, they turned against him in a violent and highly emotional way.
The middle class had three fears: first, that it was dangerous to have a state dominated by a clique of the biggest and rather corrupt business interests; second, that they would have to pay for Mr Thaksin’s populism through increased taxes and the resulting economic disorder; and third, that Mr Thaksin’s formula — an alliance of big money and big numbers — would make the middle class politically irrelevant.
Continued - See next post
http://www.bangkokpost.com/topstories/topstories.php?id=120556
Continued from previous post:
What next?
The best guide is history. The alignment of social forces around the 2006 coup is similar to that around the coup of 1976. On one side are the ruling elites, army, and urban middle class. On the other is the rest, with a strong rural weightage.
In both 1976 and 2006, the coup was a reaction against a political challenge with its centre of gravity in the countryside. In 1976, Bangkok felt threatened by a Maoist insurgency, a peasant movement, and a student movement which sympathised with rural demands.
In 2006, Bangkok again felt threatened, but this time by a political leader and political party which had built unprecedented support in the rural areas of the North and the Northeast by delivering a range of populist programmes, and promising more.
After 1976, the establishment solution was a formula of ‘‘managed democracy’’ with three main parts: constitutional engineering to produce a system that was democratic in form but insulated against the risk of mass takeover, military oversight of political activity from top to bottom and a public campaign for national unity around the monarchy. All these three parts are seen again in 2006.
The 2007 draft constitution deliberately sets out to weaken the prime minister and the political parties. It installs a semi-appointed senate to serve as a conservative deadweight on the parliament. It aims for a return to the fluid coalition politics of the 1980s and 1990s.
The Internal Security Bill gives massive powers to the army chief to oversee politics from top to bottom. The military has tried desperately to undermine support for Mr Thaksin using old-fashioned methods of disruption and intimidation.
This strategy of ‘‘managed democracy’’ will not be as easy as in the post 1976 period, because of the large changes over the intervening thirty years. Thailand’s globalised economy is incompatible with military rule.
The 1985-95 boom raised income levels, and multiplied the number of interests that are promoted or protected through political actions. Since the early 1980s, elections have become established for parliament and later for local government.
There is a dense pyramid of electoral organisation extending down from MPs through local government heads to village canvassers. Many have benefited from electoral democracy.
The attempt to ‘‘manage democracy’’ might fail completely, unless it is flexible. Many people are unhappy about the 2007 draft constitution, and the attempt to pass the internal security bill. Civil society groups have opposed the current army chief’s ambitions to become the next prime minister. Many in the informal mass feel Mr Thaksin and TRT have been martyred. These resentments can be explosive.
From exclusion to inclusion
Mr Thaksin’s populism, the coup and ‘‘managed democracy’’ are all strategies to exclude opponents from the democratic process. Mr Thaksin hijacked the constitution in order to neutralise opponents to his political ambitions. The coup tore up the constitution in order to undermine Mr Thaksin’s massive electoral support. The 2007 constitution is written with the single-minded aim to prevent the return of Mr Thaksin and the social forces he has come to represent.
Politics will only become stable when the political system reflects and accommodates all the important social forces and political aspirations in the society.
Competitive strategies of exclusion will only add to social division and political tension.
Democracy succeeds in societies where enough of the major social forces come to realise that elections, parliaments and public debate (for all their messy faults) are better ways to resolve the conflicts in society than power, repression, exclusion and violence.
In such societies, everyone agrees to accept a set of rules and institutions, and to play within them, rather than trying to subvert the rules or tear them up at the first opportunity.
The first step towards such a stable system has to be an inclusive procedure for writing the rules. Whatever faults the resulting charter had, the 1997 process at least was an attempt at such an inclusive procedure. The 2007 process was not and as such will inevitably be a false start.
It is time to aim for an inclusive politics. Perhaps the most difficult task in Thai politics now is how to convince the triple alliance behind the coup of 2006 to accept a political system which accommodates everybody fairly.
http://www.bangkokpost.com/topstories/topstories.php?id=120556
However, for some grounding on the practicality of achieving even a slightly increased inclusiveness, take a look at this thread and its link:
http://www.angkor.com/2bangkok/2bangkok/forum/showthread.php?t=2633
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19762112/site/newsweek/page/0/
ASIA'S CRONY ECONOMY
The Ties That Bind
By Joe Studwell
Newsweek International
Crony capitalism is stunting southeast Asia, says the author of a new book on the region's godfathers.
http://www.prachatai.com/english/news.php?id=458
Straight to the Point : The agenda for civil society in the new year
Jon Ungphakorn
02 January 2008
Article
I am not going to use this column to make any New Year wishes. New Year wishes are wishful thinking, especially if one were to wish that a new government, headed either by the People Power party or by the Democrats, would carry out the reforms so badly needed in our country to strengthen democracy, human rights and social justice; seriously combat all forms of corruption, while at the same time reducing the powers of the bureaucracy, the military and the mafia-type power brokers that patronise rural society.
It would be equally futile to wish the new government to be able to resolve the chronic, violent conflict in our southern border provinces.
Instead, I want to propose a New Year agenda for civil society which hopefully will help to generate greater unity and strength for civil society as a whole, and at the same time set the stage for a permanent and more prominent role for civil society in pushing for reforms leading to a more democratic, more peaceful, less corrupt and more equitable society where eventually everyone is guaranteed basic rights and freedoms as well as a reasonable quality of life. Wishful thinking? I hope not.
By the term "civil society" I am referring to reform-minded individuals and social organisations in Thai society such as the NGO movement, community organisations and networks, workers' unions, religious groups, etc.
In the coming year, the role of civil society will be critical in keeping government from selling out the rights and interests of the common people, in helping to resolve social/political conflicts, and in institutionalising major reforms.
For civil society to be strong, it is important that civil society organisations maintain strict political independence and avoid being sucked into the mainstream political conflict of "pro-Thaksin" versus "anti-Thaksin" politics.
Our present Constitution provides civil society with a number of tools to carry out its tasks. One of these is the right to submit people's bills to parliament with 10,000 signatures of support. Parliament is required to consider these bills, and to allow representatives of the proponents to have one-third of the seats on parliamentary committees considering such bills.
Civil society can also make use of the Administrative Court to challenge controversial government policies and programmes, as was successfully done by consumer networks in their challenge to the Thaksin government's attempts to privatise the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand.
Civil society can also demand public hearings on important foreign agreements that the Thai government wishes to sign.
These are just some of the ways that civil society can exert influence on those in power. My proposed civil society agenda for 2008 is as follows:
1. Reform of broadcasting media to allow a diversity of independent radio and television stations catering to all sections of society, including public broadcasting systems and genuine community radio and television stations.
We need to make the new Public Broadcasting Law really succeed in establishing an effective independent broadcasting regime to facilitate public education, debate and participation in the affairs of our country.
2. Urgent repeal and amendments to all laws that violate the basic democratic rights and freedoms of the people. We need to use people's bills to repeal martial law, the recently passed Internal Security Law and the dictatorial decrees of various military junta that still have the status of law. The Computer Crimes Act needs to be amended to allow freedom of expression on the internet without fear of persecution.
3. Making sure that the government does not try to sell out the interests of the public by privatising vital public utilities, transportation and services, or by signing international or bilateral foreign agreements that adversely affect our sovereignty, the well-being of the population, or cause us to protect intellectual property rights beyond our necessary commitments to the World Trade Organisation.
4. Establishing a movement to promote welfare state policies, with immediate focus on access to education and pensions for all. The recent semi-privatisation of state universities needs to be reversed so that they can fully serve the public interest.
5. Establishing a civil society forum to tackle the conflict in the southern border provinces through public education and dialogue among concerned parties.
6. Discussions on how to establish sustainable grassroots-based political parties that do not depend on individual financial or political backers, and serve the interests of the economically deprived sections of Thai society.
These, in my view, are some the more important issues that should keep civil society busy during the coming year.
Civil society includes anyone acting in an individual capacity or as part of a civil society network or movement to participate in the affairs of the country.
I hope that you will be willing to join in and support those civil society activities that you agree with.
Jon Ungphakorn is a former elected senator for Bangkok and at present Chairman of the Thai NGO Coordinating Committee on Development. Comments are welcome at: ungjon@usa.net
First Published in Bangkok Post. Link may expire:
http://www.bangkokpost.com/News/02Jan2008_news013.php
http://www.prachatai.com/english/news.php?id=457
2008: The Beginnings of the Mobilization of a Third Alternative
Isariya Paireepairit, Siam Intelligence Unit
30 December 2007
Article
Note: The writer originally intended to use the title ‘The Beginnings of a third alternative political party' but decided to change this for reasons explained in the article.
Many Thais hope that the political crisis that began at the end of 2005 and has dragged on until today can end with the parliamentary elections on 23 December 2007. These have an important role in pushing the military back to the barracks and leading the country back to a democratic system.
But these elections have in no way solved the problem of conflict inside the country. On the contrary, the conflict has clearly become worse, especially the conflict between the middle class and the lower class, which reveals different needs and is shown through support for 2 large political parties.
(The cause of this situation, in the view of Surasak Thammo in his article ‘Thailand after 23 December 2007'i, is the basic social structure problem of unequal distribution of income, which has persisted for decades.)
The results of this election demonstrate that Thai politics s in a period of change from a politics of region (southerners vote for Chuan, people in Suphanburi vote for Banharn) to a politics of class (the urban middle class vote for the Democrats, the lower classes upcountry support the People Power Party). Even if there are other parties that can win locally, the number of MPs isn't big enough to have a significant impact. This shows that regional politics is quickly losing its importance.
The question is, are the Thai people satisfied with this new kind of choice between just two alternatives?
A reaction which the writer has observed since before the election, apart from the ‘jeer Samak, cheer Abhisit' and ‘cheer Samak, jeer Abhisit' kind, and which is an increasingly common opinion, is ‘I don't know who to vote for; I don't like either.'
This kind of opinion is a good example of the yearning of the Thai people for new political alternatives. In broad outline, political parties according to this ideal must have an up-to-date image, appear honest (which the People Power Party cannot do) and respond effectively to people's needs (which the Democrats were constantly attacked for not doing). It is easy to say that you will respond to the needs of the middle class and the lower class at the same time. But in fact, there is really n party that does this. (And under the conditions of a parliamentary system of politics, we can assume that it will also never happen in the future.)
But even if we leave aside these ideals for a third alternative political party, there is still no third political party. (Here we are not interested in small parties which cannot progress from local politics to a politics of principle or policy.) In the end, the ‘neither' group end up with a ‘no vote', or decide to vote on the basis of the individual.
However, the writer has observed that in 2007 a small political movement began to grow. This includes such groups as those meeting at Sanam Luang in the middle of the year to oppose military dictatorship, the movement to kill the draft 2007 constitution in October, and those calling for the NLA to stop passing legislation in December.
Added together, these mobilizations were not large. Participants are both the urban middle and lower classes. Most have specific ideologies and are likely to be led by academics outside the mainstream (who attack public intellectuals who accepted the coup), or are new social activists who were ‘politically awakened' after the 19 September coup.
The really interesting point is that these movements have kept up their momentum (their effectiveness is very high in comparison with their numbers). They are organized in an integrated system of different movements and use technology to their advantage. It can be said that this is raising the standards of political mobilization to a new level which activists will have to maintain in the future.
The writer questions whether it is necessary for a third political alternative to take the form of a political party. Future political struggle therefore may arise from independent movements which coalesce to make policy demands on political parties in parliament, using as a bargaining tool the votes that these groups can mobilize in favour of parties that respond to their needs.
A third alternative movement in future will not necessarily be in the form of a simple large political group, but rather as a mobilization ‘network' of many small groups who work together. These groups will operate independently with no formal structure. They will not need to support the same proposals all the time, but will cooperate with when they have a common platform, and go their separate ways when they see things differently.
In the past we have seen many mobilizations of professional groups of local groups (such as the Caravan of the Poor, or associations of sugar-cane growers or rubber-tappers). The mobilization of the third alternative network which the writer has proposed resembles these in principle, but in practice, a third alternative network of this kind goes beyond mobilization on the streets to an integrated form of mobilization. This is many times more effective and has learned how to bargain cleverly for their interests and to figure out politicians better than before.
The writer still cannot see clearly the outlines of the third alternative movement. It will eventually evolve into a new form. The period after the 19 September coup can be seen as the incubation period of this network. After the 23 December 2007 election is the period when the network must find its feet, and accumulate power and influence to the point where its bargaining power is sufficient and it knows the strengths and weaknesses of the new form of extra-parliamentary political struggle, where no one so far has any experience.
Whether it is successful or not, this movement will eventually be the beginning of a democracy where the people's sector really participates.
Finally, the writer points to the interview with Kasian Tejapiraii, who says that if there is no third alternative, it means the defeat of people like is, with no one else to blame.
i Surasak Thammo, ‘Thailand after 23 December 2007' - Sam Intelligence Unit, 24 December 2007.
ii Interview with Kasian Tejapira: Towards Solidarity "If there is no 3a, we will lose" - Prachatai, 23 May 2007.
Source: บทความ : 2551 : กำเนิดกลุ่มการเคลื่อนไหวทางเลือกที่สาม?;
http://www.prachatai.com/05web/th/home/page2.php?mod=mod_ptcms&ID=10713&Key=HilightNews
Sulak Sivaraksa to sue police commander and Gen Surayud for banning his book
Prachatai
16 January 2008
News
http://www.prachatai.com/english/upload/pictitle/20080116163018_sulaksa.jpg
[Photo: Prachatai - The cover of a banned book by Sulak Sivaraksa.]
Well-known social critic Sulak Sivaraksa, author of the banned book ‘Almost a Century of Thorn-filled Thai Democracy', will lodge a court case against the Special Branch Police Commander and the Interior Minister at the Central Administrative Court today (Jan 16).
Pol Maj Gen Sombat Suphajiva and Gen Surayud Chulanont in his capacity as Interior Minister will be the first and second defendants respectively.
Sulak wants the court to lift the Special Branch Commander's order prohibiting sales and distribution, and confiscating copies of his book that was published in April 2007.
On Oct 1, 2007, Pol Maj Gen Sombat Suphajiva acting as printing authority issued Order 5/2007 banning Sulak's book that criticizes Thailand's democracy, alleging that the material ‘may cause unrest and degrade good morals' in Thai society. Copies of the book have been confiscated by the police since.
Sulak appealed to Interior Minister Gen Surayud Chulanont on Oct 8, 2007, and never received a response. So he decided to ask the Administrative Court to lift the ban order and have the defendants pay him damages of 1,094,000 baht with an annual interest rate of 7.5% starting from the date of prosecution.
Sulak said that the Special Branch Police had illegitimately and unlawfully issued the order to ban and confiscate his book without presenting any reasons and facts to prove what part in the book ‘may cause unrest and degrade public good morals', and had failed to grant him a chance to defend his book.
The authority of the Special Branch under Article 9 of the 1941 Printing Act to ban and seize books is also outdated, infringing on the people's rights and freedoms, and goes against Article 45 of the 2007 Constitution. He also asks the Central Administrative Court to forward the case to the Constitution Court to rule on this point.
http://www.prachatai.com/english/news.php?id=485
http://rspas.anu.edu.au/rmap/newmandala/
I have received the following message from Ji Ungpakorn, author of A Coup for the Rich (http://rspas.anu.edu.au/rmap/newmandala/).
Thai Special Branch Police ban the sale of “A Coup for the Rich”
I have just been informed today by Thammasart University bookshop, the only bookshop to agree to sell my book, that the Thai special branch have issued a letter to the shop banning the sale of “A Coup for the Rich”.
This book, which was published in January 2007, has sold over 900 copies, almost its entire print run. Mostly the book was sold directly by myself or by Thammasart University bookshop. This is because my own university bookshop refused to sell the book, citing “incorrect procedure”.
“A Coup for the Rich” criticises the military coup and the liberals who supported the coup. It discusses the role of the Thai Monarchy, citing the work of Paul Handley (The King Never Smiles). There is a chapter on the politics of the Peoples’ Movement. The final chapter deals with the crisis in the South.
I shall provide updates of the situation as they become clearer. Anyone wishing to obtain copies of the book can do so by sending me 200 baht. Alternatively people can download this book for free in pdf file form from: www.pcpthai.org, or http://wdpress.blog.co.uk/, or http://www.isj.org.uk/ .
The banning of academic books by governments or bookshops is a gross infringement of democracy and academic freedom. Unfortunately this practice has become more frequent under the junta. The emergence of a PPP government lead by Samak Suntarawej is not encouraging either. As Interior Minister in 1976, Samak banned around 100 academic books and ordered their removal from libraries throughout the country.
[UPDATE from Ji:] Bangkok Metropolitan Police, acting under an appeal from the Special Branch to investigate my book, have issued a letter to the Thamasart bookshop banning the sale of “A Coup for the Rich”. According to the letter, dated 18 January 2008, the book is currently under investigation concerning charges of lèse majesté. The letter, signed by deputy police chief Chutti Tamanowanij, states that the continued sale of the book risks creating a “misunderstanding” about the Monarchy among the Thai population. The book is on sale at the New Internationalist bookshop in Melbourne and Bookmarx in London.
Reuters article on same topic:
http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-31631620080128
'A Coup for the Rich' download in .pdf format:
http://www.isj.org.uk/docs/CFRbook.pdf
See also previous post on this subject:
Ji fights on for his book
The controversial book "A Coup for the Rich" by political scientist Ji Ungpakorn, which was published in January last year and banned by Chulalongkorn University's Book Centre, is now available online. [Mod: http://www.isj.org.uk/docs/CFRbook.pdf ]
Ji, a declared Marxist, said Monday he decided to make his English-language book freely available in the cyber world in protest at the latest attempt by the government to ban his work.
Thammasat University bookshop, the only one to sell his book, told him Bangkok police, acting for the Special Branch which is investigating it, had issued a letter on January 18 banning further sales. It returned 85 copies of the book to him.
The letter said the book was being investigated for lese majeste. Signed by the deputy police chief Maj-General Chutti Dhamanowanij, it said continued sale of the book risked creating a "misunderstanding" about the monarchy among Thais.
"The banning of academic books by governments or bookshops is a gross infringement of democratic and academic freedoms. Police accusations that the book is misleading about the monarchy are unacceptable," Ji said.
Published in January last year, "A Coup for the Rich" criticises the military coup and the liberals who supported it. It discusses the role of the Thai Monarchy, citing the work of Paul Handley's "The King Never Smiles". There is a chapter on the politics of the Peoples' Movement. The final chapter deals with the crisis in the South.
In February last year Chula Book Centre refused to sell the book primarily because some of the sources quoted were from "The King Never Smiles", which is banned by the authorities.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/01/29/national/national_30063763.php
Asian Sentinel article today:
http://asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1012&Itemid=31
On January 28, Thailand’s Special Branch officially banned the sale of "A Coup for the Rich," by Associate Professor Giles Ji Ungpakorn of the Political Science Faculty of Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok. The book criticizes the 2006 military coup and the liberals who supported it. Ungpakorn says, “The emergence of a PPP government lead by Samak Suntarawej is not encouraging. As Interior Minister in 1976, Samak banned around 100 academic books and ordered their removal from libraries throughout the country. The banning of academic books by governments or bookshops is a gross infringement of democracy and academic freedom.” That is a statement with which Asia Sentinel wholeheartedly agrees.
Accordingly, we print the following academic paper by Prof. Ungpakorn, questioning the power of the Thai king.
Wisarut
29-01-08, 12:41 PM
Ajarn Gile (Ji) siad they that "FInancial Disciple" is just an execuse for the Rich to suppress the poor by depriving the finanacial resources ... while the ricvh is wasting billions of Baht and dollars ...
However, If our government were follign what Ajarn Gile is advocating, our Baht Banknotes will be worthless like thsoe neighbour countries ... worth a piece of tissue paper! :eek:
Obviously not the Finance portfolio then! ;)
Khun W? Is there a Thai language version of this book. The reason I ask is that it seems to have been written in such a way that it might be understood by intermediate Thai speakers of English - perhaps to compensate for it not having been published in Thai, and to ease translation by others. One imagines that some publishers are prepared to print English language books on thai issues, but NOT to print them in Thai. CU, for example, has demonstrated on a number of occasions that it barely tolerates some of Ji's work.
Wisarut
29-01-08, 03:00 PM
Obviously not the Finance portfolio then! ;)
Khun W? Is there a Thai language version of this book. The reason I ask is that it seems to have been written in such a way that it might be understood by intermediate Thai speakers of English - perhaps to compensate for it not having been published in Thai, and to ease translation by others. One imagines that some publishers are prepared to print English language books on thai issues, but NOT to print them in Thai. CU, for example, has demonstrated on a number of occasions that it barely tolerates some of Ji's work.
Probably not.
However, the follwing Prachathai Article written by Gile Ungphakorn has pointed out that
FInancial Disciple is just an execuse for the Rich to suppress the poor by depriving the finanacial resources ... while the ricvh is wasting billions of Baht and dollars ...
http://www.prachatai.com/05web/th/home/11011
Straight to the Point : A social reform agenda for the new government
Jon Ungphakorn
01 February 2008
Article
Well, after two years of derailment, here we are, back on the rusty tracks of "Thai democracy". And to pilot the country into the new era is our notorious new Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej who will most likely be joined by such well-matching personalities as Chalerm Yubamrung as interior minister and Plodprasop Suraswadi as environment minister.
A dream team for a nightmare.
To tell the truth, I have absolutely no hope whatever of seeing any social reforms being initiated by this infamous coalition of power-hungry politicians ready to sleep with anyone as long as it's on the golden bed.
Nevertheless, I have decided to compile a 12-point agenda for a social reform policy, at least to serve as a marker for the kinds of changes in social policy that I, and many other civil society activists, would like to see.
1) Strict adherence to the rule of law.
This means that the powerful and powerless must be treated equally before the law. (It has never happened in Thailand.)
Extrajudicial killings must cease. (Unfortunately, Chalerm has promised to renew the infamous "war on drugs".) There must be no political interference in investigations and criminal proceedings against any individuals within or linked to the government. Radical police reform and mechanisms to provide real police accountability to the public are absolutely necessary. Investigative powers after arrests and charges need to be shifted from police to prosecutors.
2) Semi-autonomy for the southern Muslim majority provinces.
As I stated in a previous column, the only real way out of the violence and conflict in these southern provinces is to "decolonise" the region through negotiations with local community leaders of all races and religions.
We have to accept some form of self-government or autonomy in which local culture and traditions are allowed to prevail, and in which the area is governed by its own local leaders, not by governors appointed from Bangkok. Peace would be enforced by local police and military units, while outside forces would be withdrawn.
3) Respect for community rights.
All local communities in Thailand should be allowed to determine their own ways of life and to live according to their own culture and traditions, using local languages in schools, community radio, and local government.
The constitutional rights of communities to manage their own local resources - land, forests and water - need to be strengthened, as well as their right to protect themselves from environmental damage from outside. This means that no industrial, mining, power-generation or dam projects affecting communities would be allowed to go ahead without their informed consent.
4) Respect for media freedom and independence.
This is the most important issue for the development of democracy in Thailand.
First of all, the new public broadcasting act must remain untouched with no political interference in the selection of the board of the public broadcasting authority.
The computer crimes act needs to be amended to remove the overhanging threat of criminal proceedings that is affecting freedom of political expression on the Internet.
Newspaper advertising by government agencies must be strictly non-discriminatory so as not to influence editorial freedom.
Radio and television broadcasting frequencies need to be reallocated by a new independent broadcasting commission to allow multi-sector broadcasting including genuine community radio and television.
The prime minister cannot be allowed to have his own radio or television programme to speak to the public unless the opposition leader and civil society leaders are allotted equal time to respond on the same stations.
5) Repeal or amendment of all laws that violate democratic principles.
These include the recently passed internal security act and the law on public administration in emergency situations that is being used in the southern border provinces.
The criminal code regarding the crime of lese majeste also needs to be amended to allow legitimate democratic expression of views regarding the monarchy.
6) No free trade agreement with the US on present negotiating terms.
In negotiating free trade agreements with Thailand and many other countries, the United States has consistently insisted on protection of intellectual property rights relating to medicines and health treatments that go well beyond the requirements of the World Trade Organisation.
US requirements include extension of patent protection lifetime, data exclusivity, no pre-grant opposition to drug patent applications, patenting of surgical procedures, etc.
For Thailand to agree to these demands would spell disaster for our universal health insurance programme and to our perfectly legal generic production of essential life-saving drugs. It would mean probable premature death for well over 100,000 people living with HIV/Aids who now have access to anti-retroviral therapy that keeps them healthy.
The Thai government should make it clear that no agreement is possible while such US requirements remain.
I will conclude my social reform policy agenda in next week's article.
Jon Ungphakorn is a former elected senator for Bangkok and is now chairman of the Thai NGO Coordinating Committee on Development. Comments are welcome at: ungjon@us
First publised in Bangkok Post
http://www.prachatai.com/english/news.php?id=509
http://2bangkok.com/pinkmanit.jpg
[Above: 'Pink Man' inserted in a famous photo of a policeman shooting into Thammasat University during the 1976 coup. Interior Minister Chalerm says he was standing next to the drunken policeman. ;) http://2bangkok.com/manit.shtml ]
The Senate, 6th October, the South and Thai Democracy
Giles Ji Ungpakorn
21 February 2008
The tragedy of Thai democracy today is that we have a Prime Minister and Interior Minister who tell bare-faced lies and an opposition, in the shape of the Democrat Party, that supported the 19th September coup, insulted the poor and never showed an interest in the 6th October in the past. The tragedy is worse because the only real force in Thai society which widens and protects the democratic space, the Peoples' Movement, is running around trying to seek favours from either the military or Thai Rak Thai/P.P.P. The latest farce is the fact that many leaders of the Peoples' Movement put their names forward to be appointed senators. It is a farce because after grovelling to the military, these leaders got kicked in the teeth. None were selected. It is also a tragedy because Thailand has a long history unelected senators and the military coup in 2006 turned the clock back by reducing the number of elected seats in the senate. We need to move beyond the simplistic view, encouraged by anarchistic ideas, that representative democracy has failed because of money politics and therefore we have to either rely on the military or just pretend that we don't need to deal with the issue of political power.
I don't want to go into detail about what Prime Minister Samak or Interior Minister Chalerm said about the 6th of October bloodbath. This is common knowledge. In the latter case I've heard people say that Chalerm is right to talk about a "drunken policeman letting off his gun", but he seems confused by history. The incident actually took place recently in a pub and a policeman died at the hands of someone's son. However, the issue which has received far too little publicity is Samak's statement to Al-Jazeera T.V. that the people who died at Takbai in 2004 "just fell over because they were weak from fasting... no one intended to kill them... what is wrong with that?" This disgraceful statement indicates the total lack of commitment by this government to Human Rights. It raises serious concerns as to the revival of the War on Drugs by Minister Chalerm. Will the guns of thousands of drunken police and army officials "just go off by accident", killing another 3000 innocent people?
Samak's statement on Takbai and the 6th of October are linked. The fact that no government official has ever been punished for these state crimes means that they continue. Prime Minister Anand was a key person in pardoning the military over the 1992 massacre. Prime Minister Surayut was an army commander responsible for some of that brutality. But he was painted as a "good man". Put bluntly, we have a culture of accepting state crimes and accepting the lies about such crimes. Compare the lies by Thaksin about Takbai with the lies about 6th October. They are the same... foreigners involved, massing of arms, the necessity of the security forces to act in the interests of peace etc...Compare the way prisoners are captures, stripped, tied up and abused. The cycle is repeated over and over again.
Where is the outrage from the Democrat Party, the junta supporters and the media over all these issues? Where was the outrage by the Democrats about the junta's media and book censorship? The Democrats led Thai governments on 3 occasions since the 6th October and have never initiated any investigation of events.
In fact there is no big secret about what happened. In 2001, I was part of a fact-finding committee, set up by non-government organisations, to investigate the 6th October. We published a detailed report. It is quite clear that all the major sections of the Thai ruling class at the time were of the opinion that the Left-wing student movement had to be destroyed with violence. This was after all, one year after the Communist victories in Indo-China. When I say "all" sections of the ruling class, I mean the Palace, the army, the political parties, especially Chart Thai, and the business community. The students were attacked by the Border Patrol Police. Who gave the orders? We don't know. Look at the scandal surrounding the B.P.P. today. Samak's role as a young right-wing politician was to encourage the mob to attack the students and then to justify the events afterwards.
When I have tried to speak the truth about this I have faced censorship. Back in 2001, the Bangkok Post cut the section of my article which referred to the Palace and then tried to sue me when I complained. Recently, I was invited by ex-senator Chermsak to appear on a live T.V. programme about the 6th October on Mr Sonti's A.S.T.V. channel. When I mentioned the role of all sectors of the ruling class, including the Palace, Mr Chermsak immediately received a phone call on his mobile from the owner Sonti. This is the same Sonti who was part of the Peoples Alliance for Democracy which complained that Thaksin had censored the media. I was not born yesterday and I know that the State and the business class control the media, but I never thought I would be lucky enough to see this kind of thing with my very own eyes.
One reason why some sections of the People's Movement accepted the military constitution was that they believed that a half appointed senate would allow their representatives to be appointed. Many of these same people refused to join the pro-democracy demonstration at the end of the Thai Social Forum in October 2006. I remember attending the N.G.O.-Coordinating Committee's discussion about the new constitution. The invited speak from the junta's side said that this would be the "first time" that we could have N.G.O. people as senators. He obviously "forgot" that N.G.O. senators had previously won elections to the senate, one was Chair Person of N.G.O.-COD. at the time!! Will the lessons be learnt about the need to build an independent political movement of farmers and workers? Rosana is standing for election to the senate in Bangkok on 2nd March and I shall vote for her. But unfortunately she has made no serious attempt to reach out to the various movements to gain support and build a dialogue about what kind of general politics we need in the movement. It is almost as if she was standing just as an individual.
We do not have the luxury of carrying on in the same old manner. The Peoples' Movement was poisoned by the P.A.D. leadership which dragged too many people into supporting the "yellow-ribbon" coup. The opposition in parliament is hardly serious or principled about social justice and human rights. Meanwhile the killings in the South continue and the vast differences between rich and poor remain. The lesson from the 6th October is that the Thai State must be taken to task over the South. We need the military to be withdrawn so that a political solution can be established. We also need to campaign for a welfare state, funded by progressive taxation of all the rich.
http://www.prachatai.com/english/news.php?id=532
Thai Language source:
http://www.prachatai.com/05web/th/home/11254
Thailand’s crisis: a “Carnival of Reaction”
Giles Ji Ungpakorn, Left Turn, Thailand
02 July 2008
Article
Left Turn, Thailand
www.pcpthai.org
The term “Carnival of Reaction” was first used by the Irish Marxist James Connolly when referring to the defeat of socialist politics in Ireland and the rise of reactionary Catholicism and reactionary Protestantism either side of the partition border.
Thailand’s political crisis after the 19th September 2006 coup and the December 2007 elections is also becoming a “Carnival of Reaction”. On the one hand we see the deterioration of Thai Rak Thai from a modernising capitalist party with pro-poor policies, but a dreadful human rights record, into the Peoples Power Party, headed by ultra Right-wing Prime Minister Samak Suntarawej. His cabinet is staffed with gangsters and sleazy politicians.
On the other hand, we see the so-called Peoples Alliance for Democracy (P.A.D.), which organised large demonstrations in 2005 and 2006 to oust Prime Minister Taksin. The movement started as a coalition between Peoples Movement leaders and the right-wing Royalist businessman Sonti Limtongkul. This movement was never particularly progressive in its demands, but it has now degenerated into a proto-fascist organisation. Firstly they called for the King to sack Taksin and appoint a new Prime Minister back in 2006.
Then they supported and welcomed the 19th September 2006 military coup. They supported the idea of appointed senators, rather than elections for the upper house. They backed, and continue to defend, the military’s anti-democratic Constitution. Now they are raising the ultra Right-wing slogans of “Nation, Religion and King” while playing fascist nationalist songs from the 1970s. In late June 2008 they started a row to try and whip up crude nationalist sentiment over the Khmer temple “Preah Vihear”. This hill-top temple was built by the Khmer (Cambodians) at the time of Ankor. It now sits on the modern border between Thailand and Cambodia. In the 1960s the site was claimed by the Thai military regime, but the Word Court ruled against the Thai government. The present ridiculous row arises because the Cambodian and Thai governments want it designated as a World Heritage site. The P.A.D. scream that this is a “loss of Thai Sovereignty”. This idiotic accusation is without foundation. The temple was clearly built by the Khmer, not the Thais, who were underdeveloped at the time. The site has officially been in Cambodian territory for 45 years. Never the less national chauvinists do not care about mere facts.
The reason why the P.A.D. felt the need to use demagogic nationalist politics was because they have tried all means to get rid of Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party which was transformed after the coup into the Peoples Power Party. Repeated demonstrations, a coup, a court inspired dissolution of Thai Rak Thai and a military Constitution, all failed to dent the electorate’s support for the parties. That is why the P.A.D. have now suggested that parliamentary elections be scrapped for 70% of M.P.s. The poor obviously “cannot be trusted with the vote”.
The opposition Democrat Party under the twin leadership of young, Oxford educated, Abhisit Vejjajiva and Korn Chatikavanij, also favours authoritarian means. Its extreme neo-liberal policies are not popular with the poor who are the majority of the population. They supported the 2006 coup and the P.A.D. and want though internet censorship on alternative news websites like Prachatai. Recently they spent much time in their parliamentary debate attacking the government for “selling Thailand’s Sovereignty” down the river over Preah Vihear. The adoption of infantile chauvinism comes from having nothing of substance to say. The mainstream English language and Thai language press are no better. The Bangkok Post and the Nation actually take the issue of Preah Vihear seriously without question. In the Carnival of Reaction, intellectual faculties have been surgically removed from some people’s brains.
How did it get to this stage? One important reason is the lack of independence among Peoples’
Organisations, N.G.O. networks and Social Movements. This lack of political independence stems from a refusal to take political theory and party building seriously. The concentration on single-issues and political lobbying means that the Peoples Movement has sought one White Knight after another, rather than building a party of the Left.
In 2006, before the coup, we in The Peoples Coalition Party (and Left Turn newspaper) were constantly frustrated by the large anti-government demonstrations organised by the P.A.D. For years we had opposed the Thaksin government on the grounds of gross human rights abuses and privatisation. Yet the P.A.D. demands were thoroughly reactionary. We could not join them, yet we were far too small to influence the thousands that did. When the military staged a coup in September that year, we immediately came out publically against it. Since then we have tried to work with many in the Peoples Movement in opposing authoritarian measures. We have also played a significant part in highlighting the rightward drift of the P.A.D. so that today, many social movements and networks have declared themselves against any new coup and have pulled out of the P.A.D. We are busy building an independent class position in the movement, which rejects the P.A.D. and the government. Hopefully we can be part of ending this Carnival of Reaction.
http://www.prachatai.com/english/news.php?id=691
Wisarut
25-07-08, 10:37 AM
http://www.prachatai.com/english/news.php?id=691
Khun GWR,
The Carnival of Reaction refered by those left wing intellectual is the clear sing that those left wing intellectuals have UNDERESTIMATED the power of Faith (Shraddha) ... If the left wing intellectuals have meddled around with Faith, they will confront with the Wrath from Faithful FOllowers who are supposed to be the alliance of the left wing.
Now, the article "The Carnival of Reaction" have already created the CRACKS within the left wign intellectuals ... Somsak Jiamthiamsakul vs. GIle Ungphakorn -> Look at this and you'll see:
http://rspas.anu.edu.au/rmap/newmandala/2008/07/02/ji-ungpakorn-on-the-carnival-of-reaction
http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1301&Itemid=31
One to spit venom at in all probability!? :D Enjoy!
Former Left-Right Alliance against Globalization and America
Thongchai Winichakul
28 July 2008
Article
Almost all Thai rightists I interviewed for my recent research perceived that the threats to Thailand today are capitalism and America. Even lifelong anti-communist ‘Phor’, an alias used for this research, who has tenaciously held the idea of national security being under threat from two strands of communism, sees that Thailand has to be cautious of the CIA interfering and agitating groups of Thai people to the point of being a threat to security. Of course, they were well aware that the threats from capitalism and America are not one and the same as the communist threat.
The rightists’ discourse of capitalist threat obviously differs from the leftists’ Maoist anti-capitalist discourse of 30 years ago. These rightists speak pretty much the same anti-neo-liberalism and anti-globalization language which Thai intellectuals and activists have adopted since after Oct 6, 1976.
Although all the interviews were done years after the 1997 economic crisis, the pain caused by the capitalist crisis was still alive in their memories. Their discourse on the cause of the crisis turned out to be nationalist and against ‘farang’ or western capitalism, pointing to western capitalist giants led by the US bullying emergent smaller capitalist nations. For the ease of digestion and propagation, it was made a story of conspiracy among a handful of global political and financial figures, often including George Soros in particular. The ‘Washington Consensus’ was understood simply as a plot by western capitalist neo-conservatives to destroy smaller states. With the calamity besetting Thai nationalist capital which had eagerly embraced globalization over a decade earlier, globalization has become undesirable. Their discourse against western capitalism was therefore not of a socialist bent, but was outright nationalist, against those ugly farangs abusing decent Thais.
Most of the interviews were done during the years of Thaksin administration which was seen as representing the evil western capitalism, subsequently labelled as ‘vicious or immoral capital’. The exasperation against Thaksin and globalization and the global anti-American sentiment fed into one another. Among the rightists I interviewed then, only one person liked the Thaksin government, and the rest were suspicious of Thaksin because he was pushing the agenda of globalization.
The main discourses that have effectively captured the anti-globalization sentiment include Thainess, the sufficiency economy, western threats and globalized capitalism.
The sufficiency economy is thus no theory, or economic or life philosophy, but a powerful discourse that defines ‘Thai’ as ‘non-capitalist’, or even as opposing to capitalism. Capitalism has been perceived to be a western threat against the desirable Thai-style economy and way of life. The sufficiency economy discourse draws a clear line between capitalism as an external threat and the sufficiency economy as a beautiful, inherently Thai solution. That is the most important task of the sufficiency economy.
Several academics have tried to point out the incongruence of sufficiency economy both in terms of theorization and policy formulation, or its irrelevance. It does not matter, nonetheless, as that is not what the sufficiency economy is supposed to do.
Post-Oct 6 left and right alike have adopted this same discourse. Many old-time leftists have jumped on the bandwagon.
Somsak Jeamtheerasakul has proposed that a major shift among leftist intellectuals after Oct 6 is reconciliation with the monarchy. Why is that? Somsak usually explains that those people do not have a right mind or clear thinking, or political correctness, or are opportunistic, etc. In my view, the reconciliation with the monarchy is part of—not causally, but consequentially—the intellectual inclination towards the monarchy, so powerful that the attitude towards the institution has changed and the issue has been sidelined. The post-Oct 6 leftist intellectuals take on globalization from a nationalist, bourgeois moral high ground, prioritizing as the most crucial socio-political agenda the crusade against the western capitalism.
Post-Oct 6 left and right alike thus loathe and fear those they hold as agents of the globalized capitalist ‘farangs’, or the ‘mean capital’ as the ultimate threat to Thai society. This anti-globalization stand, however, does not remind them of the evil of the huge monopolistic capital which has taken a much deeper root in Thai society, having a much broader and firmer economic and business base than any other due to its holding of real estate assets, holding the unmatchable social cost due to the association with sacredness, securing a strong conservative political base underpinned by the bureaucratic and judicial forces, and in essence being also part of globalization. They just turn a blind eye because it is so closely associated with being Thai.
Why is it not labelled as ‘mean’? Its close association with being Thai prevents it from being perceived as a threat against the decent Thainess. It has even hardly been seen as capitalist: being an inseparable part of Thai identity for so long, it is thus not capitalist. The sufficiency economy discourse helps further disguise it. Many old-fashioned leftists still hold the belief that the sakdina (feudal lords) are not as dreadful as western globalized capitalism.
After the fall of the leftist, socialist movement, there are many legacies including:
1. non-left and non-socialist anti-capitalism sentiment, which has become an accessory of the nationalist, conservative, moral, post-colonial bourgeois anti-capitalist mentality, or ultimately a kind of nationalist capital;
2. non-left movements for ‘the people’, which have become a moral, conservative, nationalist and populist movement, also conforming to the post-colonial bourgeois mindset.
After Oct 6, the left has become less left, or just stopped being left.
The anti-capitalism sentiment of the post-Oct 6 ‘people’s movements’ has become of the moral, conservative and nationalist type, with the remaining left, if any, being under its umbrella. Because of that, the post-Oct 6 so-called left can collaborate with the bourgeoisie’s conservatives and nationalists, as well as nationalist capital without problem, as long as the fight against western capitalism is the priority agenda. Certain thinkers in the ‘people’s movements’ believe that ‘the people’ are ‘using’ the institution to fight globalization, the greatest foe. They just ignore the history that points out that Thai-associated capital and the royalists have been the biggest obstacle of Thai democratic development.
The socialist left has long been finished. The post-Oct 6 so-called left are a faction of the moral, bourgeois and nationalist movement.
The ‘reconciliation’ is not about switching sides, but a result of the intellectual inclination mentioned above. One is made to think that the bourgeois, nationalist, moral high ground, in fact, has been their basis since the October period; i.e., they may not have changed much as they are thought to have been, and the seemingly strong stance towards the monarchy may indeed not have been fundamental in their political perspective as has been understood. Therefore, to reconcile or not is not a matter of life and death for them.
At the same time, the old-time right is also finished.
If the major change among the post-Oct 6 leftist intellectuals is the reconciliation with the monarchy, that of the post-Oct 6 right must be the divorce from the west or farangs, with an ever growing distrust. In terms of historical time scale, it can be said that the period of trust in the west during the cold war was just a brief moment. After that, the Thai elite and society have returned to the mode of associating with but distrusting farangs as it had always been from the late 19th century until the cold war.
If the attitudes towards the monarchy and western capitalism are two lines that were drawn between the right and left during the October era, 1973-6, the shifts among the post-Oct 6 rightists and leftists have cancelled out this polarization, and resulted long ago in a regrouping. With regard to attitudes towards western capitalism, the line between left and right has been messed up for quite a long while, perhaps since after the cold war. The regrouping began at the 1997 economic crisis or before that, not just during the recent few years of political turmoil, but the anti-Thaksin movement and the Sept 19 coup were concrete evidence of the changes.
For over a decade at least, the former left and right have agreed that the fight against globalization is the most crucial socio-political agenda.
The royally-composed anti-communist songs and the leftist songs like the Internationale, whose meanings have been deeply associated with the politics during the October era, have been losing their original implications, along with the line dividing the left and right. New and different meanings for those songs are now up for grabs. One gets to hear these songs nastily back to back on the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) stage in 2008, because the PAD is the utterly vicious manifestation of the changes.
Translated by Ponglert Pongwanan
Thai Language Source: ธงชัย วินิจจะกูล: ทำความเข้าใจ ‘ซ้าย’ – ‘ขวา’ สามัคคี (http://www.prachatai.com/english/news.php?id=715)
A briefing on the continuing crisis in Thailand
Giles Ji Ungpakorn
04 September 2008
For the past two or more years – and especially since the September 2006 coup – Thai society has been hypnotised into forgetting about its real social and political issues. Instead, the whole of society – and, most tragically, the social movements – have been entranced by a fight between two factions of the Thai ruling class.
On the one side is the Thai government, the ruling People's Power Party, the former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his former party Thai Rak Thai.
On the opposing side is a loose collection of authoritarian royalists, comprising the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), elements of the military and judiciary that supported the coup and the Democrat Party. The authoritarian royalists are not a unified body – but they share a collective interest in wiping out Thaksin's party.
The two sides are mirror images of each other. Both are firmly in the camp of the Thai capitalist elite. Both are nationalistic and prepared to abuse human rights.
Thaksin's former government and current prime minister Samak Sundaravej's government support extrajudicial killings and a hardline murderous position against the insurgency in the south of Thailand.
But the opposing side also cares little about such killings. It counts General Panlop Pinmanee, who oversaw a massacre at Krue Sae mosque in 2004, among its leadership.
Corruption
Both factions are associated with people who have a record of corruption. It is common knowledge that all Thai politicians are engaged in corrupt practices, whether legal or illegal.
The military also has a long record of corruption and the junta that oversaw the illegal coup in 2006 is no exception. After the coup, they appointed themselves to boards of state enterprises and forced through increased military spending.
Yet the courts have clearly been used to single out Thaksin's faction on charges of corruption and "abuse of power". And while Thaksin was still in power, the courts bent to his wishes.
So there is no real justice in Thailand. The judiciary are not accountable to the electorate and always support the rich and powerful. In labour courts they always rule against trade unions. There is no jury in Thailand.
Political strategies
There are some differences between the two factions. Thaksin's side is committed to a strategy of winning power by elections, parliamentary democracy and money politics. The PAD and their friends favour of military coups, reducing the number of elected MPs and increasing the power of unelected bureaucrats and the army.
The justification for this is the belief that the poor majority in the country are too stupid to be given the vote. The PAD faction are also fanatical royalists. They want a new coup and were happy to whip up hatred of neighbouring Cambodia and to risk a war over an ancient Khmer temple.
The PAD strategy, as outlined by one of its leading figures Pipop Thongchai, is to create enough political chaos that institutions and parties are destroyed, with a "new order" arising from the ashes. Needless to say, this new order will not be democratic, nor will it have any commitment to social justice or equality.
Economic policies
In terms of economic policy, the Thaksin faction wants to use a "dual track" strategy that mixes neoliberalism with elements of grassroots Keynesianism. They say the poor must not be left out and they do have a record of implementing pro-poor policies such as a recent heathcare scheme. However, they are not remotely socialist and are opposed to taxing the rich or building a welfare state.
The PAD and the other royalists, in contrast, are hardline monetarists. They propose interest rate hikes, cutting down spending on the poor and squeezing wages.
King Bhumibol Adulyadej, the king of Thailand, is one of the richest monarchs in the world. According to the Financial Times, he supports a monetarist economic policy and has also advocated a "sufficiency economy" where everyone curbs their spending according to their means. That means income redistribution is ruled out – which is why the poor have consistently voted for the Thaksin faction.
Social movements
Compounding this situation is the total disarray of the social movements, NGO networks and trade unions in Thailand. After the collapse of the Communist Party in the mid 1980s, the new slogan of the people's movements was "the answer is in the villages".
This was an NGO strategy to promote to rural development along single-issue lines. The slogan also reflected a respect for villagers which contrasted greatly with the attitude of the government.
Now the slogan of those people's movement networks that are supporting the PAD has changed to "the villagers are stupid and don't deserve the vote!" or "the answer is with the military, courts and the king".
Sections of the NGO Coordinating Committee, some Thai staff in Focus on the Global South, HIV+ networks, Friends of the People and some farmer groups have all lined up to support the PAD and the demand to decrease democracy.
The railway workers' union and the Thai Airways union have also shown their support for PAD. The rail union leaders have never campaigned for hundreds of rail employees who have been on temporary contracts without welfare for decades. The Thai Airways union has ignored military corruption in the airline and in the airports authority.
Both unions have turned their backs on serious attacks on trade unions in the private sector and are only prepared to take action when people in high places give them the green light.
Activists pulled
Other activists who cannot stand the PAD have allowed themselves to be pulled into supporting the government. This is just as bad as those supporting the PAD. Some have even cheered when the police tried to break up PAD protests.
The lack of independent class politics in the Thai people's movement is a result of years of rejecting any kind of overall politics or political organisation. This stems anarchist ideas that became popular after the collapse of the Communist Party as a reaction to the party's Stalinist authoritarianism.
The problem is also a result of the "lobby politics" of the NGOs. Neither strategy leads to building an independent position for the trade unions and social movements. They reject "representative democracy" – but have no concrete democratic proposals to put in its place.
Build independence
Even today, at this late hour, we can still build political independence. We must campaign for more democracy and more control of institutions from below.
We must advocate a root and branch reform of the justice system, a reduction in the role of the military and the building of a welfare state through cuts in the military budget and progressive taxation of the rich.
Yet there are still those who say that we must take sides in the current elite dispute and leave such reforms until later. The problem with that is that the dispute will not be settled quickly.
And even if it is settled, it will be on the terms of one or other elite grouping – and that will result in a smaller democratic space and less bargaining power for social movements.
Giles Ji Ungpakorn is based in Bankgkok and is a member of the Worker's Democracy socialist organisation in Thailand
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